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The proliferation of news and information has reached unprecedented levels. Notwithstanding this 
apparent richness, increasing doubts about the quality and diversity of online news have grown for many 
years. The list of threats to information online is quite long. In this essay, we concentrate on economic, 
quality and social threats, with the goal of starting to address a few fundamental questions: is pluralistic 
and quality information an endangered public good in the digital age? What responses are available to 
preserve media pluralism and a professional process of information production as the necessary tools 
for a democratic society? 
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1. Introduction* 
In this digital era, the spreading of news and information has reached unprecedented levels. The results 
obtained, in term of basic information and the ability of the world’s population to “know,” using the 
Internet, and electronic communications and media in general, are awesome, and the 21st century has 
been rightly defined as the information age (Castells 1996). Nonetheless, this unprecedented abundance 
of information, concerns about the health of media pluralism and the quality and diversity of news, have 
increased in recent years. This is not a paradox. 
The list of threats and concerns relating to the characteristics of information in the Internet world is 
quite long. We will concentrate, here, on those that we consider the most important, and we will try to 
examine the precise origin and content of these risks and to discuss the responses that are emerging, or 
are likely to emerge, from our markets and societies. In the final part of the essay, we will consider 
whether, faced with the lack, or weakness, of autonomous responses, there are sufficient reasons for, 
and concrete possibilities of, a more active public policy to defend media pluralism and the quality of 
information. Are media pluralism and quality information undersupplied public goods in the digital age? 
Are we only in the presence of a market failure that can be obviated by public intervention, or is some 
kind of public presence a necessity justified by a more general political and democratic foundation? 
After this introduction, which motivates the theme, Section 2 discusses digital threats to media 
pluralism that are underlined in the academic literature, dividing them into two general categories: 
threats produced as a general consequence of the new economic models that have emerged with the 
digital revolution, and threats to the quality of information provided by the new media, which derive 
directly from their technological evolution.  
In Section 3, we discuss the limited likelihood of an effective market response, and we therefore 
explore the necessity of explicit and multi-dimensional public policies to preserve quality news and 
media pluralism as public goods that are indispensable to democracy. A brief conclusion follows.  
2. Digital threats to media pluralism 
In this short overview, for ease of exposition, and conscious that categories overlap, we will separate 
the threats to media pluralism and quality information created by digital transformation into two main 
categories: the first is an economic category that primarily endangers media pluralism, while the second 
is a technical characteristic that mainly interferes with the quality of information. We will firstly examine 
those threats that are a direct consequence of the disruptive action of the digital revolution on the 
business models of ‘traditional’ media, and that are favoured by the specific economic configuration of 
the new online media. Then, we will concentrate on the threats to quality of information, deriving or 
reinforced by the technical characteristics of the new digital environment, an environment in which 
information is essentially produced and distributed by different subjects, and in which the weakness of 
the intermediation between the producers and consumers of news allows unusually wider spaces for 
malign and/or self-interested disinformation. 
2.1 Threats to media plurality 
The economic decline of the ‘traditional’ media can be better understood if inserted into a more general 
economic trend. Recent studies (e.g., Grullon et al. 2017) examine the evolution of the product market 
concentration in the US industries over the last 40 years, and they document the greater concentration 
in the US industries since the beginning of the 21st century. The study also analyses the relationship 
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between concentration and profitability, finding that industries experiencing an increase in concentration 
have enjoyed higher profitability, which is, in turn, reflected in higher returns to shareholders. However, 
higher profits that are gained through higher margins appear to be related more to increased market 
power, than to any increase in efficiency that is due to scale. In this respect, evidence is also provided 
that the completion rates for M&A transactions, including mega M&A ones, have constantly increased 
over time and that, in parallel, antitrust enforcement has experienced a significant decline, at least during 
the administration of the last two Presidents of the United States. 
The culture, information and communication industries are among those that have been marked by 
higher concentration in recent years. While the foundational idea of the Internet was inspired by 
informational liberalism and was informed by a vision of networked computing as a public property that 
served the general interest, large parts of the web are presently dominated by a few leading players, 
almost all of whom are based in the US, who have consolidated their dominance over the last decade. 
The acknowledgement that the group of companies, popularly called GAFAM (Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Apple and Microsoft), have established a dominance on the digital markets has nowadays 
become common sense, and there is a rich literature that has flourished on the topic. While, as users of 
their services, we clearly perceive how pervasive their presence is in every single aspect of our lives, 
the rise of these companies has been documented by several scholars (Smyrnaios 2018; Galloway 2017; 
Barwise & Watkins 2018; Moore & Tambini 2018), and their scale, reach and dimension, although data 
relating to these are not always easily accessible (Moore 2016), are widely known. Evidence indicates 
that, today, these enterprises are the most valuable companies in the world in terms of market 
capitalization (Fig. 1). 
Figure 1. Market capitalization of the biggest internet companies worldwide, as of May, 2018, (in 
billions of U.S. dollars. Source: Statista1) 
 
Note: in red, the most recent values of the top 5 companies. Source: Nasdaq, 01 March 2019 
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The literature that has focused on the analysis of the features of the business models and strategic choices 
that have enabled the rise of these tech giants and the establishment of their economic power on the 
digital markets, is abundant. Rochet and Tirole, the authors of a seminal contribution on two-sided 
markets (2003), firstly discussed how the business models of apparently dissimilar businesses, such as 
payment cards, telecommunications networks, computer operating systems and, obviously, media, all 
show network effects under which the value of the service for one group (e.g., advertisers) depends on 
how many members of the other group(s) (e.g., readers) are in the system, and vice versa. Two-sided 
platforms behave in ways that seem surprising, from the point of view of traditional industries, but which 
are perfectly reasonable once one understands the business problem of getting different groups of 
customers (or sides of the market) on board. Prices do not follow marginal costs on each side of the 
market, but their levels and structures, as well as the businesses’ investment strategies, are set to 
optimize output by fully harvesting the indirect network effects that are available on both sides (Evans 
2002). For this reason, profit-maximizing prices may entail below-cost pricing to one set of customers 
for the long haul, and, as a matter of fact, many two-sided platforms charge one side prices that are 
below the marginal cost and that, in some cases, are negative (Evans & Schmalensee 2007). Facebook, 
Google, and others, do not charge users for their services in order to grow their user base to a size where 
it becomes more attractive, and quite indispensable, to other users and to advertisers, performing the 
crucial roles of providing a common (virtual) meeting place and facilitating interactions between the 
members of the two distinct customer groups (thus minimizing, in economic terms, the transaction 
costs). The literature on platforms usually distinguishes between two kinds of network effects: direct 
(or same-side), which arise when the benefits of using a platform for a user is positively correlated to 
the number of users using the same platform, and indirect (or cross-group), which arise when the benefit 
to users in one group depends on the number of users in the other. Indirect network effects emerge in 
relation to pre-existing interdependence and complementarity between demands coming from different 
groups of consumers: this complementarity fuels a self-reinforcing feedback loop that has the effect of 
hardening the incumbent platform’s base advantages (Gawer 2014: 1241) favouring “winner takes all” 
or “winner takes most” dynamics. As a consequence, in many large digital markets, competition is 
mostly “for” the market, and thus, once a company achieves clear market leadership, this appears quite 
impossible to displace. While Evans and Schmalensee (2016) partially contend this view, arguing that 
“network effects can create great value rapidly, but they can destroy it just as fast” (ibid.), for the 
majority of analysts, the rhetoric that states that, on the internet, “competition is only a click away” (this 
became Google’s corporate mantra2) essentially sounds like an empty phrase, and, certainly, the tech 
giants seem extremely unlikely to lose dominance in their core market(s) at any time soon (Galloway 
2017, Barwise & Watkins, 2018).3 
The business strategies that these companies typically implement, including the gathering and 
exploiting of vast quantities of users’ data, creating proprietary standards and platforms, realizing 
massive investments in R&D, both organically and through acquisitions (especially in high-potential, 
emerging product markets and technologies, such as augmented and virtual reality, self-driving car 
technology, and in the creation of connected, voice-activated home hubs), are all factors that are 
certainly increasing their distance from potential competitors, and that are raising formidable entry 
barriers to newcomers.  
In any case, digitalisation has profoundly disrupted the ‘traditional’ cultural and information 
industries by: a) separating information from physical media (the non-rivalry of digital goods); b) 
jeopardizing pricing decisions (imposing non-exclusivity, to some extent), and giving relevance to 
different (non-monetary) metrics, (such as data and “attention loads”, Wu 2017); c) reducing the 
                                                     
2 https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/Googlepresentation.pdf  
3 Rather, the debate is focused on whether the new internet giants are different to traditional, non-digital, monopolies, and 
should therefore be dealt with differently. There are at least two ways in which it may be argued that digital monopolies 
are distinct from their analogue equivalents: prices (services appear to be given for free), and network effects (barriers to 
entry look less concrete and “physical” than in the traditional network industries).  
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marginal costs for the storage, processing and distribution of large amounts of information to close to 
zero; d) reducing the transaction costs of the economic exchanges even more radically than in other 
markets (Smyrnaios 2018). 
The effects of these changes can be clearly seen in the data presented in the two figures below, 
showing, for the US, a declining trend in the numbers of daily newspapers and in their paid circulation, 
which, while it had undoubtedly started some time earlier on, accelerated in a significant manner with 
the mass spread of digital media. Fig. 2 shows data on the number of daily newspapers circulating in the 
United States from 1970 to 2016: in recent decades 462 daily newspaper closed (-26%), but almost 200 
of these closed between 2000 and 2016 (-13%), i.e., half of the decline is concentrated in recent years. 
Fig. 3 shows that, since 1985, the circulation of paid newspapers has fallen by 32 millions (-51%), but, 
again, the decline has been considerably accelerated with the rise of the internet era, with a reduction of 
more than 24 millions of copies from 2000 onwards, a decline of -45% in 15 years. 
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Figure 3. Paid circulation of daily newspapers in the United States from 1985 to 2017 (in 
thousands. Source: Statista5) 
 
On the face of these characteristics of the online information markets, the business model of the 
traditional media is experiencing a progressive and constant deterioration, since digitalisation has altered 
the behaviours of both consumers and advertisers, therefore negatively affecting the two main sources 
of revenue: sales to readers/viewers and advertising. While the global advertising spend is constantly 
increasing, data reveals a continuous migration of advertising towards the digital environment: 
according to a PwC analysis (PwC, 2018), since 2016, Internet advertising revenues, mostly driven by 
mobile phones, have surpassed broadcasting TV revenues. Online advertising has also surpassed TV 
advertising in the European Union, starting from 2014: and in the period 2009-20176 advertising 
expenditures on the Internet tripled, while expenditure on television advertising stayed more or less 
stable, and newspapers’ and magazine advertising expenditure declined strongly. The United Kingdom 
is the country in Europe with the highest online advertising spending: in 2016, UK advertisers spent 
almost as much on online ads as advertisers in Germany, France and Italy combined. In mature markets, 
such as Sweden (54%), the United Kingdom (53%) and Denmark (51%), online advertisement already 
represents the major share of the total media advertising spend. In digital advertising, Google and 
Facebook have established a relatively recent7, but now massive, dominance (in 2017 they accounted 
for more than 60% of global online ad revenues8): the duopoly’s share is even higher in European 
countries (in the U.K., in 2016, for example, these companies attracted over 70% of all digital 
advertising spending9). However, even if Facebook and Google’s revenues continue to grow, other 
                                                     
5 https://www.statista.com/statistics/183422/paid-circulation-of-us-daily-newspapers-since-1975/ 
6 Data source: European Audiovisual Observatory (Council of Europe) (2017), The EU online advertising market. Update 
2017, available at: https://rm.coe.int/the-eu-online-advertising-market-update-2017/168078f2b3  
7 In 2012, Facebook had just over 5% of the global ad expenditure. 
8 Source: Statista (https://www.statista.com/chart/12179/google-and-facebook-share-of-ad-revenue/) 
9 https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2018/03/19/digital-duopoly-declining-facebooks-googles-share-of-digital-ad-
dollars-dropping/ 
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digital companies, such as Amazon and Snapchat, have recently been emerging as important contenders 
in this market. 
As an example, one can mirror the decline of the advertising revenues of the New York Times, from 
2006 to 2017, with the explosion of Facebook’s online advertising revenues from 2009 onward. In the 
same years, while the New York Times (Fig. 4) lost 1,6 billions of US dollars of advertising, a scarey -
74%, Facebook’s online advertising revenues (Fig. 5) jumped from 764 millions of US dollars to about 
40 billions, a stunning +5.128%. 
Figure 4. New York Times Company’s advertising revenue from 2006 to 2017 (in millions of U. 
S. dollars. Source: Statista10)
 
  
                                                     
10 https://www.statista.com/statistics/192907/advertising-revenue-of-the-new-york-times-company-since-2006/ 
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Figure 5. Facebook’s advertising revenue worldwide from 2009 to 2017 (in millions of U. S. 
dollars. Source: Statista11) 
 
In hypothesis, monopolistic threats to information seem to derive from the high market shares of a few 
digital gatekeepers. In particular, Google and Facebook, and, probably soon, Amazon, in their zones of 
the Internet, have market shares that are much higher, in global terms, and that were rarely seen in the 
previously dominant sectorial companies in the media world. It is possibly only public broadcasting 
that, before market liberalization, had a similar dominance in an information sector, but normally these 
companies, being under public control, were regulated by some kind of “internal” pluralism obligations, 
at least in democratic countries. These types of controls, or obligations to digital gatekeepers, have not 
existed for many years, and it is only recently that some timid self-regulatory attempts12 have begun. 
Economic threats to the historical model of financing the traditional media, which is based on the 
joint sale of news and advertising, or of other services (entertainment or other information services), are 
a source of increasing concern in relation to media plurality. The traditional media’s sources of income 
are rapidly decreasing, and a new economic model for the media that is based on producing and selling 
quality news, has not materialized on any significant scale (except for niche products, e.g., The 
Economist). The development of online advertising, and especially of ad-smart advertising, renders 
increasingly obsolete those generic sales of the audience to advertisers. The threat coming from the 
spread of self-generated content, and the impoverishment of the traditional media, may directly 
jeopardize the existence of a journalistic profession, thus becoming another example of the progressive 
disappearance of the middleman, as is happening in many other areas of the economy. The difference is 
that, in other areas, the middleman was often a factor of inefficiency and rent exploitation, while, in 
producing news, the mediation of a specific and neutral professional category has a specific role in 
                                                     
11 https://www.statista.com/statistics/271258/facebooks-advertising-revenue-worldwide/ 
12 The Code of Practice recently agreed with the EU Commission by the major OTT companies and the advertising industry, 
is an example, see:  
 (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation). 
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creating or preserving quality, especially by keeping a distance between immediate and partisan interests 
and the news. 
2.2 Threats to quality of information 
Given two of the general functions of the Internet - interpersonal communication and content 
dissemination over digital media - the concentration of economic power presents worrying political 
implications: the “civic power” of the tech giants extends to the processes governing the formation and 
exchange of opinions and the establishment of reputation and popularity (Moore 2016). Recent events 
have led many scholars and analysts to “question the role of social media seen as responsible for 
distributing fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; Tambini 2017), using manipulative psychometric 
profiling (Cadwalladr 2017), undermining authoritative journalism (Bell 2018; Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017) and, ultimately, jeopardizing the fairness and transparency of elections” (Tambini 2018). 
The debate about disinformation online became relevant in 2016 during the campaign for the 
“Brexit” referendum, and after the US Presidential Elections; since then, several studies have addressed 
the circulation of misleading and false news on online platforms, and especially on Facebook and 
Twitter. While none of the phenomena observed during these episodes is new in itself, the relevant 
aspect, in this context, is that online platforms help to promote the spread of news both rapidly and 
globally, triggering the "viralization" of content. The expression “fake news” has become quite popular, 
although there are different understandings of what exactly counts as fake news. According to Allcott 
and Gentzkow (2017), this could be defined as news that is “intentionally and verifiably false, and could 
mislead readers”, but many scholars refute this expression, which does not encompass the complexity 
of the phenomenon13. Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), for example, prefer to refer to categories such as 
misinformation - the inadvertent sharing of false information - disinformation - the deliberate creation 
and sharing of information known to be false, and malinformation - the exploitation of truthful 
information to do harm (either by moving private information into the public arena, or by using people’s 
affiliations, like their religion or sexual preferences, against them). Besides conceptual clarifications, 
there is still limited scientific evidence on how widespread the “information disorder” (ibid.) is, and on 
what kind of real impact it has on individuals.  
Facebook has estimated that so called ‘fake news’ accounted for less than one-tenth of 1% of the 
civic content shared on the platform (Weedon et al. 2017), but the methodology used to estimate this 
percentage is not very clearly explained (Lazer et al. 2018). Another study estimated that the average 
American encountered between 1 and 3 stories from known publishers of ‘fake news’ during the month 
before the 2016 elections (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Talking specifically about politics-related 
disinformation, a recent study, published in Science, reports that ‘false news’ items on Twitter are 
typically retweeted by many more people, and far more rapidly, than are “true news” items (Vosoughi 
et al., 2018).  
The picture is further complicated by the widespread use of social bots, computer algorithms that 
automatically produce content and that interact with the social media’s human users. These bots are, in 
some cases, specifically designed to exploit and manipulate social media discourse with rumours, spam, 
malware, misinformation, slander, or even just noise. A recent study published in Nature (Shao et al. 
2018), based on the analysis of a large corpus of news stories posted on Twitter during and following 
the 2016 US Presidential Elections, concludes that bots may play a critical role in driving the viral spread 
of content from sources with low-credibility. The authors of the study found that social bots amplify the 
spread of misinformation by exposing humans to low-credibility content and inducing them to share it.  
                                                     
13 In October, 2018, the U.K. government banned the term "fake news" from official documents, see 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1630/163002.htm  
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Besides the challenge to establish the veracity of the information being disseminated, social bots 
have brought a novel challenge, since they can give the false impression that some piece of information, 
regardless of its accuracy, is highly popular and is endorsed by many, exerting an influence against 
which we haven’t yet developed effective social antibodies (Ferrara et al. 2016). “Computational 
propaganda”14 is the term that is often used to encompass recent digital misinformation and 
manipulation efforts: it is defined as the use of algorithms, automation and human curation to manipulate 
public opinion across a diverse range of platforms and device networks (Wooley & Howard 2016).  
The new techniques of data mining, which have vastly increased the quantity and precision of voter 
information, contribute to the amplification of the potential harm of these practices. Contemporary 
political campaigns rely increasingly on detailed voters’ profiling, fuelled by the available data sets 
relating to citizens’ online behaviour, including their use of social media. While personalised political 
advertising (via social media) has the potential to diversify political campaigns, reaching the groups who 
have opted out of traditional media exposure, increasing citizens’ political knowledge, and mobilising 
them around topics that they may find relevant - which all contribute to democratic dynamics 
(Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2018), micro-targeting voters also brings with it serious threats, such as the 
invasion of privacy, data breaches, a decrease in political knowledge and pluralism, manipulation, and 
the exclusion of certain groups (Nenadic 2018).  
The personalized experience that social media and search engine algorithms can offer to their users, 
since they propose the information s/he would like to see on the basis of detailed analysis of his/her data, 
including location, past click-behaviour and search history, feed the segmentation of the public sphere 
into ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’, leading to the “fragmentation of large but politically focused 
mass audiences into a huge number of isolated issue publics” (Habermas 2006: 423). A recent 
investigation of the topic that was carried out by the Italian NRAs (AGCOM 2018), based on a study of 
the behaviour of millions of users over several years, in relation to many information sources, found that 
the phenomenon of “selective exposure” in the consumption of news is positively correlated to the level 
of activity of the users and to a greater engagement with disseminating news via social networks. In 
other words, those that use the social media the most are more inclined to select news confirming their 
views, and they are more prone to share them with their contacts. In this respect, the plurality of 
informative sources on the Internet does not necessarily produce the expected positive effects that are 
connected to the widening of the points of view that are available to the citizens. This phenomenon is 
the result of the combination of new sophisticated digital technologies and ‘old’ social dynamics, which 
have been known about for a long time in media and communications research. Among the social 
dynamics that social media designers have mostly exploited and exacerbated are: the consolidated 
evidence that human beings tend to establish and continue relationships with people who have views 
similar to their own (Granovetter 1973); that people are much more likely to trust a message coming 
from someone known, even if s/he suspects it to be false, or that information seekers are biased towards 
information sources that share and confirm their views (again according to the theory of ‘selective 
exposure’, see Sullivan 2009).  
Several key threats to the quality of online information emerge from this preliminary review of 
contributions. In the first place, the presence of only a few gatekeepers, and the disappearance of many 
traditional and local media, may be a driver of excessive standardization and homogeneity of the sources 
of news and qualified opinions, which thus negatively affects the quality of information. The substantial 
absence of editorial control and editorial responsibility that has characterized major internet players so 
far has exacerbated, to an unprecedented dimension, the phenomena of pseudo-news of a distorted, or 
completely false, nature. The economic viability of “factories” of disinformation, financed through 
unfiltered advertising, constitutes a completely new type of threat, one that is essentially unheard of in 
the offline world (Martens et al. 2018).  
                                                     
14 See the project that the Oxford Internet Institute is carrying out in order to understand the global reach of computational 
propaganda that is based on the collection and analysis of a set of case-studies, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/  
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In second place, the polarization of opinions, in closed or filtered bubbles that are created by the 
sociological and technological dynamics of internet (social) media, can further impoverish the 
democratic dialogue and cause the exclusion of middle ground and conciliatory occasions for debate. 
These developments may change the way in which political consensus is reached and maintained, even 
in otherwise democratic environments. 
Another relevant phenomenon that contributes to the “pollution” of the information ecosystem is 
hate speech online, since, as for disinformation and misinformation, online dissemination has fuelled 
the reach and impact of hate speech, including its appearance(s) in political discourse. Hate speech has 
become a common pattern of political propaganda, even in established democracies, targeting 
minorities, women, migrants, weaker elements of society, or simply the diversity of opinions. The 
phenomenon has been exacerbated by the relative anonymity that is allowed to the haters by the Internet. 
This creates an obvious reluctance from more reasonable and moderate voices to join any public debate 
on the Internet, thus immediately contributing to the further radicalization and polarization of online 
debate. Again, as for misinformation and disinformation, the EU, and some EU member states, have put 
in place, or are planning to put in place, policies involving online platforms which are required to play 
a role in limiting the spreading of hate speech online15. 
3. Market and public responses  
The situations in which technological advances upend pre-existing business models, causing a 
disjunction between the regulatory system governing incumbent firms and the challenges posed by the 
“new” economic actors, is certainly not new. These policy disruptions (Biber et al. 2017) can be of 
different types and a range of different regulatory options are, in principle, available to set adequate 
responses. 
Confronted with the threats we have so far discussed, we suggest that the key question to be asked 
with this aim is: is there a market failure? Is the quality of information and pluralistic information a 
public good that is necessarily under-supplied in the digital environment? Or, is it an issue for social 
and political choices that has a dimension that transcends economics/consumer welfare themes, and that 
requires instead to be dealt with under the categories of the fundamental rights of individuals or the 
essential characteristics of democratic societies? 
The answers to these questions are relevant to the search for effective policy solutions to the threats 
we have discussed above: the hypothesis of an autonomous response provided by the markets is realistic 
only if we are not in the presence of a systemic market failure. Can self-regulatory actions develop more 
rapidly and efficiently than in the past? More specifically, is an effective reaction to any threat to the 
quality and diversity of online information in the interest of the major internet companies? Assuming 
that the major internet companies will autonomously react to the degradation of information is a notion 
based on the expectation that they will recognize and accept some sort of “editorial responsibility”. In 
traditional media, editorial responsibility is an element of the business model, in fact, readership and 
revenue from readers, and, consequently, the revenue from advertising, were at least partially at stake 
in relation to the media’s credibility. The new online business models don’t seem to have the same 
characteristics, and the last few years have seen clear resistance from the major online companies to 
accepting explicit responsibility for any content that is published on their platforms. Facebook, 
Google/YouTube, Twitter, and others, have all refused, for years, to recognise any kind of editorial role, 
even if sui generis. Some recent attempts, like the Code of Practice that was recently agreed with the 
European Commission, appear to be more of a political compromise through which to pre-empt, or 
delay, incoming regulation, than an autonomous market response.  
                                                     
15 EU Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online 2016, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-
detail.cfm?item_id=54300 
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If self-regulation is an unreliable or insufficient instrument, can we efficiently apply traditional 
public instruments of intervention to the globalist reach of the Internet? In the end, the questions are: 
what are the available instruments for intervention in the digital age? Does competition law remain a 
sufficient, or even a relevant, tool? Which of the other possible, specifically legal or regulatory tools, 
can be adapted to the Internet and the online world? Are the experiences of traditional media regulation 
and electronic communications regulation some sort of useful guide? Do we need new specific 
legislation, as, for instance, with the example of net neutrality? Do we have to devise new rights or 
principles for the internet, or, (apparently) more simply, do we only need to find new rules with which 
to enforce online the rights that are already present and enforced offline? Is control of the internet a 
possible ground for the courts, or for administrative authorities? Or, do we need to invent some 
completely new tool, blending instruments in an innovative way, at least for Europe? The debate is 
raging: from data and privacy regulation, to the enforcement of competition law, the right way to 
intervene online is something that is at the core of many policy debates, and it is far from clear what this 
intervention might be.16  
In the pages that follow, we will recall some of the elements of the discussion with regard to the 
different time frames of the possible responses.  
3.1 Short term 
In the short term, what is perceived to be the most imminent threat is that the concentration of 
information under only a few gatekeepers, and the technological instruments to spread disinformation 
through their platforms, may jeopardize the democratic debate and, in particular, they may alter electoral 
processes and condition their results in democratic countries.  
In fact, while there are rules for traditional media concerning the equal treatment of candidates, as 
well as safeguards for the off-line organisation of elections, such as transparency and limits on electoral 
spending, these rules are vulnerable to largely being bypassed online. The EC gave recommendations 
to the authorities, and to political parties in the EU countries, on how to ensure the transparency of 
political advertising: calling for information that is available to citizens on how much money the parties 
spend on online advertising in a campaign; clearly indicating which party or political group is behind 
any paid for, online political advertisements; and informing citizens about how they are targeted in the 
dissemination of such advertisements.17 Political parties should set an example by making political 
advertising online more honest and transparent.  
A growing attention and worry accompanied the approach to the European elections in May, 2019, 
since they are considered to be a likely moment of truth for the ability of EU institutions to contrast 
disinformation and manipulation online. At the moment, the main instrument proposed by the 
Commission appears to be a reliance on the Code of Practice, in order to address the spread of online 
disinformation and fake news, and this has been agreed with some major internet players, online 
platforms, leading social networks, and the advertising industry18. However, according to the first Report 
monitoring its implementation19, the platforms adopting the Code have so far failed to identify specific 
benchmarks that would enable the tracking and measurement of progress in the EU, a sign that the 
application of this instrument has so far been timid, to say the least. 
                                                     
16 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/building-fairer-digital-world_en 
17 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-free-fair-elections_en.pdf  
18 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 
19 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-19-1379_en.htm  
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3.2 Medium term 
a) Evolution of competition law 
The specific economics of multi-sided platform competition, and, in particular, the existence of cross-
side network effects, where the feedback loops amplify the consequences of each action, pose concrete 
problems and pressing challenges to competition authorities, which have to analyse and decide if, and 
how, to intervene in these markets. In June, 2017, the OECD Competition Committee held a hearing to 
analyse whether traditional competition tools - such as those adopted for market definition, market 
power, and the assessment of the effects of exclusionary conduct and vertical restraints - remain 
sufficient, or whether they need to be redesigned and/or reinterpreted to cope with multi-sided markets. 
The results (OECD 2018) are that, with some exceptions, i.e., the framework to assess the effects of 
‘vertical restraints’ and the standard econometric tools to assess ‘efficiencies’, which appear to still be 
applicable in the context of the multi-sided market, many key technical tools used by competition 
authorities appear to be unable to interpret and evaluate these markets. In carrying out ‘market 
definition’, the usual difficulties in operationalising the SSNIP (or SSNDQ) test are increased by the 
additional requirement to estimate the cross-platform network effects; the same issue emerges in the 
assessment of ‘market power’, in particular when tools based on consumer responsiveness are applied. 
In any case, tools that do not look at consumer responsiveness (e.g., market shares), also seem to need, 
at some point, adjustments or new interpretations in order to keep under consideration the existence of 
an interrelated market or another side of the platform. In other words, market power cannot be identified 
in a multi-sided platform by searching only on one side of the market. As for the tools that are used to 
assess exclusionary conduct, which, according to the experts involved by the OECD (2018), encounters 
fertile ground in multi-sided platforms, and these also appear to no longer be reliable (in particular, the 
price-cost tests and the recoupment tests). 
A point emerging in the debate on the adequacy of the current tools and frameworks of competition 
policy is that the potential harms to competition that are posed by GAFAM cannot be captured primarily 
through price and output, but need to take into consideration the underlying structure and the dynamics 
of markets. According to Khan (2016 and 2018), the current framework in antitrust, which is focused 
on equating competition with “consumer welfare,” is typically measured through the short-term effects 
on price and output— and it fails to capture the architecture of market power in the 21st-century 
marketplace. Indeed, in recent years, awareness and recognition of the non-price element of competition, 
such as quality, innovation and, lately, privacy (Just 2018), has emerged and has started to play a role 
in courts and enforcement agencies. 
It is clear that, in the two-sided and multi-sided markets, traditional competition tools are particularly 
ill-equipped to take non-monetary metrics into consideration (Wu 2017), and most of the recent 
economic literature on free goods has focused on two-sided markets in which the free good is provided 
in exchange for attention or information (Gal & Rubinfeld 2016). While questions related to the optimal 
use of competition law in digital markets are intensely debated, antitrust enforcement is largely framed 
as being insufficient to fix the current imbalances in the digital economy, and several scholars suggest 
reconsidering the very goals of competition law in the digital age (Ezrachi 2018; Stucke 2012). The 
debate is currently polarized between those who argue that the problems with GAFAM are not 
competition problems, and competition authorities should therefore avoid intervention, and those 
advocating the abandoning of the consumer welfare standards and for a strong application of competition 
rules (Geradin 2018). In any case, it is evident that there is an increasing entanglement of competition 
law with other areas of law, and that another key point of the debate is the relationship, or, better, the 
appropriate combination of competition and regulation in dealing with platforms. 
Solving the puzzle, and probably rethinking the scope of competition law, is particularly relevant in 
respect of the media and information industries, where the current role of the tech giants affects not just 
the markets, but, more generally, the public sphere. The issue of the limitation of ownership and 
concentration in the media industry is both one of the most complex areas of competition policy and one 
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of the most essential issues of media policy. The concentration of the market, and the dominance of only 
a few operators, have been traditionally considered major threats to pluralism in the media and 
information markets. Today, the same is true for the online platforms that are conveying most of the 
news and information, but that are not always even recognized as media. Nonetheless, a few major 
online platforms are clearly dominant, and they are dramatically changing the news environment. It has 
been observed that this dominance “brings into question whether an independent and pluralistic free 
press can survive outside the embrace of vast social networks and search engines” (Bell 2018).  
The specific role of antitrust enforcement in this modified economic environment is drawing heated 
discussion. Within competition rules that are part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, the EC Merger Regulation20 grants the EC the exclusive jurisdiction for large mergers between 
firms with a ‘European dimension’, that affect competition. The Merger Regulation includes a specific 
provision that relates to mergers affecting the “plurality of the media” (Art. 21(4)), and which allows 
Member States to apply a stricter evaluation metric to these mergers. Essentially, the EC allows Member 
States to apply tougher national regulation where they think that media pluralism may be in danger. 
Furthermore, in the past, several European countries have adopted sector specific rules that limit ad hoc 
media concentration, and they have entrusted media regulatory authorities with their enforcement.  
Given the specific cultural and democratic nature of the media industry, limiting the dominant 
positions and concentration in this sector goes beyond the traditional implementation of competition 
rules in any other sector, since it amounts to dealing with an issue that is at the core of democratic 
societies. In this respect, the application of competition rules to the media industry, especially in the 
digital age, is probably not adequately equipped to always safeguard the values and objectives, such as 
the plurality of sources and the diversity of content, which are threatened by excessive market 
concentration. In the current panorama, which is increasingly dominated by digital quasi-monopolies, 
the existing national or supranational competition rules can be evaluated as being inadequate to tackle 
the complexities of new digital media models, and as being in need of an overarching re-orientation, 
one that will eventually change and update the EU Treaties. Specifically, the very idea of accepting the 
possibility of dominant positions in the media, which is possible in other markets, could be called into 
question. Most of the existing ad hoc limits aim to preserve media plurality (such as those limits to the 
ownership of newspapers, TV stations, radios, advertising resources, and so on) appear today 
anachronistic and probably counterproductive to achieve this purpose in the digital environment. If the 
democratic process is at stake, only contrasting abuses of dominance ex-post, after their realization, may 
be too late, and too little, to preserve our democracies. For this reason, searching for a more global and 
principled response to actual threats and challenges - such as reforming European competition law - 
might be a more promising strategy. 
b) New institutional framework and the role of intermediaries 
The spread of online disinformation and of various forms of hate speech online, joined with concerns 
about their impact on elections and referenda, have raised the alarm, both in Europe and worldwide. 
While, as mentioned above, it is still unclear how strong the effective impact of disinformation in 
shaping and steering public opinion is, and regulatory responses to online “fake news” are in the pipeline 
in many EU countries. States, international institutions, including the European Union, and private 
enterprises, have discussed or adopted measures – both legislative and non-legislative – to address these 
phenomena, and several of these measures have raised, in turn, concerns about their impact on the 
freedom of expression, and respect for the rule of law. One pre-eminent example is the so-called 
NetzDG, the German Act to Improve the Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks: this law does not 
establish new grounds for the limitation of the freedom of expression in the online environment, but it 
forces online platforms to immediately remove illegal content, based on the provisions of the German 
Criminal Code, or they will face significant fines. Hence, essentially, the law grants private companies 
                                                     
20 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 
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an enforcement role, not surprisingly, serious worries have been voiced by civil rights organizations 
about the democratic acceptability of any similar solution (Access Now 2018).  
The UK is also debating “a new settlement for the internet. Not merely a set of new standards but an 
institutional framework that involves a combination of ethical self-restraint on the part of the major 
platforms, improved competencies and self-regulation by users, and a legal framework which 
incentivises harm reduction and verification” and, in the end, the creation of a “social media 
regulator”21.  
As has already been mentioned, for the moment, the EU is trying to tackle hate speech and 
disinformation through a set of actions that include self-regulatory Codes of Practice. In the medium 
term, the suggested strategy of the High-level Group on fake news includes22: 
1. Enhancing the transparency of online news, involving an adequate and privacy-compliant 
sharing of data about the systems that enable their circulation online; 
2. Promoting media and information literacy, in order to counter disinformation and to help users 
navigate the digital media environment; 
3. Developing tools to empower users and journalists to tackle disinformation and to foster a 
positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies; 
4. Safeguarding the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem, and, 
5. Promoting continued research on the impact of disinformation in Europe in order to evaluate 
the measures taken by different actors, and to constantly adjust the necessary responses. 
This multi-dimensional approach is to be followed, and updated, by the EU Commission and the member 
states, in continuous collaboration with platforms, news media organizations and civil society 
organizations. 
It is clear that if this primarily self-regulatory approach does not succeed, and doubts about it are 
widespread, the alternative is a direct regulatory attempt by public authorities, the EU Commission and 
the national regulators, but the difficulty, in terms of the efficacy and storminess of action, in the online 
environment, appears to be immense.  
3.3 Long term 
Digital media literacy and empowered journalism 
Media literacy, and especially digital media literacy, is commonly perceived to be the fundamental 
precondition for a critical approach to online content and it is therefore a core element in the future of 
media pluralism. Most analysis, and many reports, agree that this is a fundamental ground for the long-
term control of the disinformation threats that are growing online. This is probably the only topic about 
which people are concerned in relation to the immediate threat of disinformation for the democratic 
process, and activists worried about the preservation of freedom of expression online can find true 
common ground and will agree on the need for investment and action. The present situation is still 
particularly disappointing. 
Based on the results of the MPM 201723, more than two thirds of EU members (24 of 28) that were 
examined, either have underdeveloped media literacy policies, or no media literacy policy at all. This 
                                                     




23 Available at: http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/ 
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suggests that even though media literacy has often been praised as a solution to growing disinformation-
related issues, there has simply been no progress since 2016. Clearly, States should invest more in 
education on the use of the online media for populations of different ages, but this necessary process has 
not even begun in most countries. 
A specific focus of intervention, which is somehow related to digital media literacy, consists of 
favouring the technical empowerment of the journalistic profession. Offering journalists specific 
competencies to contrast disinformation et similia, and to improve the quality of information online, 
through fact checking tools and the automation of the news rooms, may become a long-term public 
policy goal. However, the latter may only be a chapter in a more general effort to find new sources of 
finance for investigative journalism. In the long term, in fact, the decline of the traditional media may 
lead to dangerous under-financing of this type of costlier, and riskier, production of quality information, 
a phenomenon that has probably already started at the local level, and in poorer markets. While PMS 
services, at least in the EU, are still a significant force, notwithstanding the political influence of 
Governments, it is, more generally possible that maintaining an effective presence of investigative 
journalism, without the direct investment of public resources, may be revealed to be impossible. 
In any case, either by market forces or by public intervention, in the long term, the emergence of a 
new effective business model for professional journalism will become decisive, since a new economic 
equilibrium of edited media is probably the key to reaffirming that watchdog role of journalism which 
remains essential for democracy. 
4. Conclusions 
In this essay, we have affirmed that the threats to quality information and media pluralism online 
essentially come from two sources: the increasing concentration of economic resources into just a few 
gigantic online platforms/media, and the spreading of the disinformation that is favoured by the available 
technological instruments. The information crisis that this joint phenomenon generates is accelerated by 
the decline of the traditional media under the pressure of disruptive digital business models that are 
rapidly subtracting readership and advertising resources from them. 
The immediate worry created by the compounding and acceleration of these processes is the evident 
deterioration of the democratic debate, and especially of the high and immediate risk of the manipulation 
of the electoral processes. Common agreed solutions, in the midst of the epochal economic and societal 
change that we are undergoing, are always difficult and controversial.  
A short-term response to the slowing down, if not the reversing, of the deterioration of the democratic 
debate seems to have to rely on the self-regulation of private global players, but this response itself 
creates a certain degree of discomfort and apprehension. In the medium term, re-examining and adapting 
the consolidated legal traditions relating to competition law and the designing of specific regulatory 
instruments that are (re)-created for the online world, and that may reveal a safer route. In the longer 
term, empowering citizens, primarily through a major educational effort to create widespread digital 
media literacy, appears to be an uncontroversial, but long and arduous, undertaking. Finally, supporting 
the journalistic profession in tackling the online world and contributing to the search for a new and 
viable business model for investigative journalism, may become a necessary public policy. 
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